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Chapter 3:
Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Prismatic
Societies           
Frank de Zwart              
1. Introduction
Rereading Fred Riggs’s Theory of Prismatic Society (1964) after many years
for the purpose of this essay was an enervating experience. The notes I scrib-
bled in the process contain the same combination of irritation (with esoteric
language and flawed theorizing) and admiration (for the many ideas and as-
tute observations) that so many critiques have put into words ever since the
book appeared. I shall not repeat these notes here1 but instead concentrate on
one aspect of the book: Riggs strongly doubts the relevance of modern public
administration principles and tools for vesting ‘good governance’ in devel-
oping countries. His ‘theory of prismatic society’ substantiates these doubts
and represents a rare stance: it opposes relativism but it also discourages in-
tervention.
As to the question ‘what causes corruption?’, Riggs’ theory exemplifies
the complexities of a comparative approach to this issue. The book can be
read as a study in corruption, but Riggs avoids using that word because it in-
vokes a moral category (see Rose-Ackerman, this volume) and Riggs is care-
ful to judge the behavior he studies. Riggs would agree with De Graaf, Ma-
ravić, and Wagenaar when they write, in the introduction to this volume, that
‘norms defining what corruption is (…) differ from society to society and
from academic discipline to discipline’. But Riggs is no relativist. He is not
concerned with the cultural imperialism or discursive hegemony that critical
scholars ascribe to international anti-corruption drives (for examples see: De
Graaf/Wagenaar/Hoenderboom, this volume). When it comes to key issues
such as economic development, equality, and stability, Riggs considers mod-
ern Weberian administration superior to other forms, and clearly thinks that
the former is prevalent in the West, and pending in the rest.
Riggs’ explanation of that difference (which encompasses his explanation
for corruption) is a text book example of the normative institutionalism that
dominated social science when he wrote his main work. Basically the argu-
ment is that organizations and institutions can only work as their designers
                                                          
1 For critical reviews accounting the rise and decline of the comparative public administration
group (of which Fred Riggs was a prominent member), see for instance: Heady (1996),
Jones (1976), Savage (1976), Siffin (1976).
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intended, if they reflect a society’s normative order.2 Organizational princi-
ples, techniques, and procedures, in other words, are not enough to prevent
corruption for if they do not resonate with a society’s normative order, these
institutions won’t work as intended. Riggs’ approach to the question ‘what
causes corruption’, then, is to inquire why the institutions that prevent it in
some places do not seem to work in others.
Riggs set out in the early 1960s to answer the pressing question why
models and techniques of modern public administration that worked so well
to establish orderly and relatively clean government in the West, did not pro-
duce the same results when exported and implemented in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America (Riggs 1964: 11-12). His answer is that the principles and
techniques of modern public administration reflect the normative structure of
Western, industrial societies, and indeed function to maintain that structure.
Transplanted into a different normative structure, the same principles and
techniques serve different functional requirements, and therefore do not work
in the same way. To illustrate, administrative procedures that guarantee re-
cruitment on the basis of merit reflect universalistic norms and function to
maintain universalism. In a different normative context, however, the same
procedure may also function to maintain particularism.
Riggs’ work contains ample illustration of this basic idea: Things are not
what they seem. Administrative institutions may look familiar (to an observer
from the West) but that is deceiving because these institutions function ac-
cording to a different logic.
‘Certainly we shall find in (…) Asia, Africa, and Latin America today formal agencies of
administration which resemble those of Europe and the United states. Yet somehow, closer
inspection of these institutions convinces us that they do not work in the same way, or that
they perform unusual social and political functions’ (1964: 12).
This conclusion has not made Riggs popular with practically minded public
administration specialists. He basically tells them that American and Euro-
pean administrative models and institutions can be established in other parts
of the world (as they were on a large scale in the 1950s and 60s), but to make
them perform as they do at home would require a normative structure that is
not there. The message is to either await normative change (but Riggs also
stresses throughout the book that there is no reason why this would necessar-
ily occur) or accept a type of public administration that is less efficient and
effective, and more prone to corruption than the ideal in the West.
Clearly this leaves people who are involved in administrative practice and
reform empty handed. As Garth N. Jones, a former advisor on administrative
                                                          
2 In this, Riggs applies an assumption in the work of Talcott Parsons to administrative behav-
ior: Roles – in casu the modern bureaucrat – are only ‘institutionalized when they are fully
congruous with the prevailing culture patterns and are organized around expectations of con-
formity with morally sanctioned patterns of value-orientations shared by members of the
collectivity’ (Parsons/Shills 1951, quoted in Powell/DiMaggio 1991: 16).
Frank de Zwart38
reform in Pakistan, puts it in a review of Riggs’ and other works in the same
tradition: When it comes to practical matters such as trying to reform the
Pakistani financial system, ‘I still believe that the U.N. Handbook [of Public
Administration] in working these kind of situations has more to offer than
anything yet produced, and certainly more than anything found in these (…)
books under review” (Jones: 1976: 99). But Riggs’ point is exactly that the
organizational forms prescribed in administration handbooks serve different
functions in different contexts. The value of this idea, I agree, is not that it in-
forms concrete steps to combat corruption. Rather, its value is to caution
against the wrong steps. ‘Prescriptions which are valid in one context may be
harmful in another’, as Riggs puts it (1964: 11).
Structural Functionalism and Prismatic Society
The basic idea in Riggs’s work is that the import of foreign normative and in-
stitutional orders in traditional societies gave rise to a new type of society.
This ‘new’ society is neither traditional, nor modern, nor necessarily mod-
ernizing. Riggs calls it ‘prismatic society’3 and argues that its characteristics
are generally misunderstood because social theory presumes that societies are
either traditional, or modern, or in transition to become modern.
Riggs’ theory is grounded in the classic modernization studies of Durk-
heim, Tönnies, and Weber, and strongly influenced by Talcott Parson’s
structural functionalism. Riggs characterizes societies with the help of Par-
son’s pattern variables, especially the following three: ascription versus
achievement, diffuseness versus specificity, and particularism versus univer-
salism. Modernization, taken as a process of ongoing functional differentia-
tion, entails an institutional (organizational) and a normative dimension. In
functionalist analysis the two are closely related, however. Social structure is
perceived as a system of rules, and rules are ‘materialized’ norms. As Talcott
Parsons puts it: ‘the structure of social systems in general consists in institu-
tionalized patterns of normative culture (1964: 86, emphasis in original).
The underlying idea in Parsons’ structural functionalism is that societies
are functionally integrated wholes – stable equilibriums – in which ‘endoge-
nous variations are kept within limits compatible with the maintenance of the
main structural patterns’ (Ibid: 87). Riggs concentrates especially on this the-
ory as the basis of a typology of societies. He sketches the ideal type of tradi-
tional and modern societies, using three of Parsons’ pattern variables as a
shortcut. ‘The viewpoint adopted in this book is that a significant tendency
exists for action in traditional societies to be predominantly ascriptive, par-
                                                          
3 ‘Prismatic’ metaphorically conveys the idea that in the societies Riggs talks about, social
structures are functionally fused and functionally differentiated at the same time, like light
inside a prism (Riggs 1964: 27-31).
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ticularistic, and diffuse’, whereas modern societies value achievement, uni-
versalism, and specificity (Riggs 1964: 23). And, as follows from the as-
sumption that societies are ‘functionally integrated wholes’, these character-
istic normative patterns are mirrored in a particular institutional structure.
The classic illustration of this idea, and Riggs also uses it often, is the family
(Ibid: 22). In traditional societies the family performs a diffuse range of
functions: besides biological reproduction it also has educational, political,
economic, and religious functions. Families in modern societies have lost
most of these functions to specific educational, economic, and political insti-
tutions.
Fred Riggs’ work is solidly grounded in the functionalist modernization
tradition sketched above. But Riggs stresses a crucial shortcoming: The ‘un-
derlying models’ implicit in the various social disciplines, he writes, assume
a modern society (in political science, economics, sociology, and public ad-
ministration) or a traditional society (in anthropology). In other words, social
theory assumes that institutions are either functionally specific (in modern
societies) or functionally diffuse (in traditional ones) while societies in be-
tween are under-theorized. The standard concept applied to such societies is
‘transitional’ – indicating a stage on the road towards full modernization. But
Riggs stresses that ‘prismatic society’ is not necessarily transitional. In line
with the functionalist assumption of ‘stable equilibrium’, he argues that so-
cieties where traditional and modern norms and institutions co-exist, have
their own adaptive mechanisms and may thus persist. ‘A prismatic social or-
der might remain prismatic indefinitely. Indeed (...) it has its own equilibrat-
ing mechanisms’ (Ibid: 38).
Riggs thus tries to undo the teleology inherent in the term ‘transitional so-
cieties’ and to conceptualize prismatic society as an ideal-type of its own
(Ibid: 4).
3. Public Administration in Prismatic Societies
Interestingly, Riggs started this exercise in social theory formation for very
practical reasons: as a public administration specialist he was concerned with
the failure of attempts (in the 1950s and 60s) to export administrative tech-
nology from the USA and Europe to newly independent countries. According
to Riggs, the reason for this failure was the misguided idea – prominent in
contemporary political and administrative circles – that administrative sys-
tems can be ‘separated, by discernable boundaries, from the surrounding so-
ciety’ (1964: x). But for public administration to be a separate system, Riggs
argues, a level of functional differentiation is required that prismatic societies
do not possess.
Prismatic societies characteristically contain a mix of specific and diffuse
traits.
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‘New market and administrative systems have displaced but not replaced the traditional
systems (...). Indeed, this mixture of old and new practices, of modern ideas superimposed
upon traditional ones, may be one of the distinguishing characteristics of ‘transitional so-
cieties’’ (Riggs 1964: 12).
Such societies enact laws and establish procedures that, for instance, guaran-
tee recruitment to public office on the basis of qualifications – a modern trait,
signifying differentiation between ascribed status and job opportunities – but
at the same time, families or kinship groups have not ‘lost’ their functions for
the allocation of employment. Consequently, Riggs argues, the institutions
and organizations that are familiar in modern states function quite differently
when they are exported to prismatic societies.
Riggs’ theory of prismatic society can be read as a study in causes of cor-
ruption. Riggs himself uses the term ‘corruption’ only sparsely, however,
which is consistent with his insistence that administrative concepts and prin-
ciples that are developed for modern, differentiated societies are misleading
when used in a less differentiated context. In a prismatic society, the principle
of separating public and private accounts competes with equally valid princi-
ples that may discourage such separation. Riggs calls this ‘poly-normativism’,
and it strikes at the hart of his thinking.
Sometimes Riggs considers poly-normativism in the standard way of ‘un-
even change’ (Eisenstadt 1966) – modern norms are internalized by some
while others live on by traditional norms. But he also uses it in a more psy-
chological way, as conflicting incentives for individuals. Conflicting incen-
tives, coming from two normative orders, cause the ‘normlessness’ (old
norms are invalidated while new norms cannot be enforced) and compro-
mised solutions that characterize prismatic administration (Riggs 1964: 181-
182). ‘Prismatic men’ may endorse the equality of opportunity assumed in a
merit system, for instance, while equally valuing obligations to kin and
friends. The dilemma this poses is resolved in compromise: ‘In practice, the
familistic and ‘merit’ systems are united in a typically prismatic form of re-
cruitment. (...) Using the pretext of eligibility based on examination [an offi-
cial] chooses from the certified those whose personal loyalty he trusts’ (Ibid:
230). Similarly Riggs discusses the conflict between ascribed and achieved
hierarchy and asks by what ‘prismatic compromise’ both can be honored. The
answer is in the concept of rank: ‘Rank is an overriding concern in prismatic
societies. It is awarded for achievement (...) but once attained, it creates an
artificial static hierarchy resembling an ascribed status system’ (Ibid: 178-
179). Riggs applies the same reasoning in passages on rules versus choices
(universalism versus particularism) in administrative practice. Prismatic so-
cieties overcome the conflict between these alternatives in the implementa-
tion phase: enforcement officers appear to enforce universal rules, but these
rules permit a ‘wide variety of personalized choices’ (Ibid: 201).
From the perspective of prismatic administration, corruption, patronage,
clientelism, and favoritism are not flaws in the system that can be corrected
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by proper procedure and law. Riggs rather sees them as inherent to the sys-
tem – proper procedure and law serve ‘improper’ functions. Procedures and
laws that belong to one normative order can be exported into another norma-
tive order, but according to Riggs the effect is that the procedures and laws
become functional to their new environment, not that they change that envi-
ronment.
India’s system of personnel transfers in public administration can illus-
trate this point. Rules stipulate that public servants have to be relocated every
three or five years so as to prevent the growth of particularistic networks in-
side offices, and between officers and clients. In India networks of personal
relationships are commonly associated with (and often equated to) ‘corrup-
tion’.4 Indeed the standard reply officials give to the question why frequent
personnel transfers are necessary is that they ‘prevent corruption’.5
However, this anti-corruption devise is also well known as a source of
corruption. In their implementation, transfer rules leave ample room for deci-
sion makers – top bureaucrats and politicians – to exchange favorable trans-
fers for loyalty or a share in the income that officials earn from bribes
(Chandra 2004: 129-131; De Zwart 1994; Wade 1985). Media, scholars, and
officials in India have considered the transfer-trade corrupt since long, but the
system is remarkably persistent. I first studied it in the late 1980s, and recent
research (e.g. Iyer/Mani 2007; Kingston 2007; Rodden/Rose-Ackerman
1997; Van Gool 2008) shows that nothing much has changed since then.
‘Corruption can be routine and commonplace without being viewed as ac-
ceptable by the population that bears its costs’, Susan Rose-Ackerman writes
(1999: 177), and India’s transfer-trade confirms that. The reason is not only
that the transfer system serves political interests in collecting money and dis-
pensing patronage (both crucial for political survival in India’s democracy),
but also that the ‘routine’ in question is administrative routine. The very rules
and procedures devised to promote modern bureaucracy, have been made
functional for a different normative order – they ‘perform unusual social or
political functions’, as Riggs puts it (1964: 12).6
                                                          
4 The idea is that ‘corruption’ is an inevitable by-product of the personal relationships that
civil servants have or build over time. It includes bribe giving and taking as well as favorit-
ism, patronage, and clientelism. Hence ‘the rule of avoidance’ and frequent transfers: the
former assures that personnel are not appointed where they have many personal relations;
the latter do not allow the time to build such relations (see De Zwart 1994: 62-66).
5 Paul Hutchcroft (1997: 645-46) argues that academic use of the term ‘corruption’ as a con-
tainer concept for rent seeking, patronage, clientelism, or any combination of these – helps
to connect academic discourse with the real world politics and real political discourse. See
also Johnston (2005: 20-21) who criticizes popular corruption indexes and studies based on
their data, for equating corruption with bribery at the expense of studying patronage and
nepotism.
6 See J. P. Olivier de Sardan (1999) for a perceptive account of widespread corruption in Af-
rica, explained in terms of modern administrative procedure that is made functional to tradi-
tional African social custom.
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4. Relativism and Prismatic Society
Unlike many authors that studied similar issues after him, Riggs’ critique on
the export of administrative models and advice does not stem from a relativist
stance. He does not argue that interference in administrative systems abroad
is cultural imperialism. On the contrary, Riggs has nothing against efforts
from Western countries to help developing countries build a modern Webe-
rian bureaucracy. He only doubts that knowledge from the social sciences –
and especially from the discipline of public administration – can contribute to
make that happen.
Because of its inherent moral load, the study of corruption has often in-
spired relativist analysis, especially in cross-cultural studies. Most definitions
of corruption somehow refer to ‘the conduct of officials who infringe the
principle of keeping their public and private concerns and accounts strictly
separate’, as W. F. Wertheim puts it (1970: 563). But since this ‘principle’ is
a product of modern bureaucracy and therefore bound to time and culture, in-
voking it to judge behavior in times and places where it is not widely shared,
is anachronism7 or ethnocentrism.
Relativist analysis in the 1960s and 70s was informed by modernization
theory with its focus on normative change and disruption of social order. It
was a ‘mild’ version of relativism because most authors in this tradition ex-
pected that modernity – including the normative order that accompanies it –
would soon become dominant around the world. Until that moment, however,
they deferred judgment. Many claim that modernization breeds corruption,
Samuel Huntington wrote in 1966, but such judgment should be handled with
care. Modernization is a gradual process and the usual pattern is that modern
norms are first accepted by educated elite who then begin to judge their own
society by these norms.
‘Behavior which was acceptable and legitimate according to traditional norms becomes un-
acceptable and corrupt when viewed through modern eyes. Corruption in a modernizing
society, is thus in part not so much the result of the deviance of behavior from accepted
norms as it is the deviance of norms from the established patterns of behavior’ (Huntington
2002: 254).
In similar vain, Wertheim writes that
When (...) corruption in many newly independent non-Western countries hits the headlines,
sociologists should not be content with the shallow judgment that it is a portent of the im-
minent collapse of these countries. (...) Rather should we analyze the phenomenon within
its own historical setting, taking into account social forces which brand as corruption prac-
tices which in the past may not have been experienced as such’ (Wertheim 1970: 562).
                                                          
7 e.g. Van Leur (1955: 287): ‘A modern strict officialdom was only created with the Napole-
ontic state. Criticism of the integrity of eighteenth-century officials is thus ex post facto
criticism’.
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By ‘social forces’ Wertheim here means the changing normative patterns that
determine modernization. About contemporary Indonesia he writes: ‘Tradi-
tional particularistic loyalties are now seen to be too narrow; but an extended
‘quasi-universalistic’ loyalty towards the Indonesian Republic is for many
still too wide’ (Ibid: 578).
Today relativism as deference of judgment awaiting full modernization
seems patronizing and outdated. To the extent that relativism is still impor-
tant for the study of corruption, it is ‘cultural relativism’ (De Graaf/Wa-
genaar/Hoenderboom, this volume, discuss various examples). Cultural rela-
tivism does not imply deference of judgment but abstention from it. It entails
‘denial of universal morality’, as Rod Aya puts it (2009: 1), and to its adher-
ents this is a matter of principle, not circumstances. ‘Placing morality beyond
culture (...) is no longer possible’, Clifford Geertz writes for instance (2000:
45-46). What is virtuous or criminal varies from culture to culture, and to
criminalize what others consider virtue is ‘not only gratuitous, it is cultural
imperialism’, as Aya sums up the relativist position (2004: 31). Samuel
Huntington puts it very short: ‘[w]hat is universalism to the West is imperi-
alism to the rest’ (quoted in Aya 2009: fn.22).
Not surprisingly, cultural relativist perspectives on corruption are strongly
criticized by scholars and activists alike (Larmour 2008). The Executive
Summary of the Transparency International’s Source Book, for instance,
speaks of the ‘myth of culture’ and notes that ‘any understanding of corrup-
tion begins by dispelling the myth that corruption is a matter of ‘culture’’
(Pope 2000: xix). According to Pope, relativism does not make sense if it
comes to corruption:
‘One could ask why there are laws against corruption in all countries, developed or devel-
oping, if in fact it is ‘part of their culture’? Why, too, one might inquire, have the people of
the Philippines and Bangladesh mobilized against a well-armed military to bring down cor-
rupt leaders? These events hardly square with a popular acceptance of corruption as ‘a part
of culture’’ (Ibid: 8).
Pope has a point here: ‘culture’ is too deterministic a concept to apply to
countries (the usual unit of comparison in corruption studies). The normative
analysis in old modernization studies is better suited for the purpose. As we
saw, an important idea in modernization studies is what S. N. Eisenstadt
(1966) calls ‘uneven change’. Modern ideas and norms are accepted and even
internalized in some circles, while others, in the same country, live by tradi-
tional norms. Moreover, the first to accept modernity are usually educated
elites, and they are the people that make laws, which might answer Pope’s
first question above.
The Source Book’s radical denial of relativism is not the last word in
Transparency International circles, however. On its Website, in answer to
the frequently asked question ‘Can corruption be seen as normal or tradi-
tional in some societies?’, Transparency International takes a milder stance:
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‘The debate over cultural relativism and neo-colonialism is a contested one. Where con-
cepts like public procurement procedures are unknown concepts, bribing public officials to
secure public works contracts does not exist. Norms and values are context-bound and vary
across cultures. Gift-giving is part of negotiating and relationship building in some parts of
the world. But cultural relativism ends where the Swiss bank account enters the scene’.8
Clearly Transparency International also struggles with the basic problem of
moral relativism: to deny it is cultural imperialism, but to accept is to ‘toler-
ate barbarity and atrocity in those cultures. Damned if we do and damned if
we don’t – either way the prospects are bleak’ (Aya 2004: 31).
Riggs’ theory of prismatic society predates the influence of relativism in
corruption studies. Riggs tried to distance himself from both the liberal ex-
pectation that developing countries were necessarily in transition to moder-
nity, and from the cultural relativism that was salient in contemporary
American anthropology (Riggs 1964: 62). There is little relativism and no
apologetic tone in his expose of administration in prismatic societies. To il-
lustrate, Riggs argues that in prismatic society, old customs lose their appeal
while ethical standards borrowed from abroad are not rooted in popular un-
derstanding. Consequently,
‘A limbo develops in which men feel free to disregard both the old heavenly command-
ments and the new earthly ethics – they rely more on cunning, violence, or insolence to
satisfy their short-run private interests. To squat, smuggle, bribe, cheat – indeed to take
what one can (...) become the prevalent rules. (…) Social norms and sanctions are neces-
sary everywhere if raw human nature is to be socialized. But in the prismatic model this
sphere of ‘normlessness’ is enlarged, with far-reaching consequences’ (Ibid: 182).
5. Good Governance as a Side-Effect
In its non-relativist stance, Riggs’ work befits today’s international consensus
more than its contemporaries. It is striking, Michael Johnston (2005: 17-18)
writes for instance,
‘how quickly past debates over corruption – so often hung up on definitions, divided over
the question of effects, and mired in a paralyzing relativism – have given way to extensive
agreement (…) that corruption delays and distorts economic growth, rewards inefficiency,
and short-circuits open competition’.
In contrast to Riggs’ conclusion about export of administrative models, to-
day’s ‘agreement’ is translated, by scholars and powerful international or-
ganizations, into a ‘consensus package’ of anti-corruption reforms that ‘amount
to recommendations that developing societies emulate laws and institutions
found in advanced societies’ (Ibid: 21).
                                                          
8 http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq
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The rejection of relativism thus makes the issue of export and emulation
of administrative institutions pertinent again.9 Like Riggs in the early 1960s,
Johnston doubts the worth of this strategy – albeit for different reasons. Riggs
argues that you cannot transplant administrative models and practices that
were designed to produce ‘good governance’ in the West, into a different
normative order and expect them to function in similar ways. Johnston notes
that recommended countermeasures such as managerial control, greater
transparency, an independent judiciary, a stronger civil society, and free me-
dia – indeed check corruption in many societies. But in those societies these
institutions were the results of political contention
‘and were devised by groups seeking to protect themselves rather than as plans for good
governance in society at large. (...) Historically, many societies reduced corruption in the
course of contending over other, more basic issues of power and justice’ (Ibid: 21-22).
This perspective – good governance as an unintended consequence of group-
interest and political contention10 – is a way out of the stalemate in which
Riggs’ approach leaves anti-corruption efforts. The problem in Riggs’ theory
is twofold: Riggs treats normative orders as given, and suggests that norms
determine behavior. The institutions of modern administration, he argues, can
only function according to the purpose in their design if this purpose reflects
the normative order. Individual behavior is reduced, in this view, to enacting
normative scripts while the formation of such scripts is neglected.
Riggs might have it backward, though. More recent research shows that
the same pragmatic and interest-driven behavior that Riggs calls ‘normless’,
produces the institutions that shape a normative order – be it often as an un-
intended consequence. Democracy and modern bureaucracy in Europe, for
instance, were never designed for the purpose of ‘good governance’ or any
other common good. We may say that people constructed democracy, Char-
les Tilly writes, but it can only mean that people
‘create a set of political arrangements the effects of which are democratic. [The term] con-
struct has the misleading connotation of blueprints and carpenters, when over the last few
hundred years, the actual formation and deformation of democratic regimes has more often
resembled the erratic evolution of a whole city than the purposeful building of a single
mansion’ (1997: 196).
Today’s outcome of this process may seem to reflect a European or Western
normative order, but it emerged out of a long-term contentious process of
bargaining (over a range of conflicting interests such as taxes, rights, and
                                                          
9 Especially since privatization and smaller government – obviously the simplest way to re-
duce administrative corruption, and much in vogue in the 1990s – can only go so far and
have not taken away the need for administrative reform and ‘good governance’(see Hutch-
croft 1997: 640-643).
10 Cf. Charles Tilly (1990; 1997) on the formation of modern states (and modern public ad-
ministration) as side-effect of war-making efforts.
Frank de Zwart46
conscription) between contenders to central power, ‘workers, peasants, and
other ordinary people’ (Ibid: 197).
Johnston formulates a similar thought with respect to the merit of interna-
tional ‘consensus packages’ of anti corruption measures and reform:
‘In the end both reform and systemic adaptation require vigorous political contention
among groups strong enough to demand that others respect their interests, rights, and prop-
erty – not just stability or administrative improvements. Too often we think of reform as a
process of asking people to back off from their own interest and ‘be good’. (...) But in fact
reform will be most sustainable and effective when driven by self interest (...) and defended
by actively contending groups’ (2005: 217).
Like Riggs, then, Johnston doubts the merit of attempts to fight corruption by
exporting institutions and ‘teaching people to behave well’. Unlike Riggs,
however, who left it at that, Johnston offers a perspective. From his work it
follows that articulating group interests, stimulating politics, state formation,
and bottom-up organizations can help the ‘good government cause’. 
